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A nascent competitor is a firm whose prospective innovation represents a serious
threat to an incumbent. Protecting such competition is a critical mission for antitrust
law, given the outsized role of unproven outsiders as innovators and the uniquely
potent threat they often pose to powerful entrenched firms. In this Article, we identify
nascent competition as a distinct analytical category and outline a program of
antitrust enforcement to protect it. We make the case for enforcement even where the
ultimate competitive significance of the target is uncertain, and explain why a
contrary view is mistaken as a matter of policy and precedent. Depending on the
facts, troubling conduct can be scrutinized under ordinary merger law or as unlawful
maintenance of monopoly, an approach that has several advantages. In distinguishing
harmful from harmless acquisitions, certain evidence takes on heightened importance.
Evidence of an acquirer’s anticompetitive plan, as revealed through internal
communications or subsequent conduct, is particularly probative. After-the-fact
scrutiny is sometimes necessary as new evidence comes to light. Finally, our suggested
approach poses little risk of dampening desirable investment in startups, as it is
confined to acquisitions by those firms most threatened by nascent rivals.
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INTRODUCTION
A nascent competitor is a firm whose prospective innovation represents a
serious future threat to an incumbent. The firm’s potency as a competitor is as yet
not fully developed and hence unproven. For example, a new, fast-growing, and
evolving online platform is a nascent competitor to the currently dominant
platform. A promising but unproven cure for a disease represents nascent
competition for an incumbent selling a therapy that is the current standard of care.
Nascent rivals play an important role in both the competitive process and
the process of innovation.1 New ﬁrms with new technologies can challenge
and even displace existing ﬁrms; sometimes, innovation by an unproven
outsider is the only way to introduce new competition to an entrenched
incumbent. That makes the treatment of nascent competitors core to the goals
of the antitrust laws. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “it would be inimical
to the purpose of the Sherman Act to allow monopolists free rei[]n to squash
nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will . . . .”2
Government enforcers have expressed interest in protecting nascent
competition, particularly in the context of acquisitions made by leading online
platforms.3 However, enforcers face a dilemma. While nascent competitors
often pose a uniquely potent threat to an entrenched incumbent, the firm’s
See infra Section I.B.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
See, e.g., Terrell McSweeny & Brian O’Dea, Data, Innovation, and Potential Competition in Digital
Markets—Looking Beyond Short-Term Price Effects in Merger Analysis, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Feb.
2018, at 5-6; D. Bruce Hoffman, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at GCR
Live Antitrust in the Digital Economy: A Snapshot of FTC Issues (May 22, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1522327/hoffman_-_gcr_live_san_
francisco_2019_speech_5-22-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8FP-PAVD]; Jeffrey M. Wilder, Acting
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the Hal
White Antirust Conference: Potential Competition in Platform Markets (June 10, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1176236/download [https://perma.cc/ARR4-QXMQ].
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eventual significance is uncertain, given the environment of rapid technological
change in which such threats tend to arise. That uncertainty, along with a lack
of present, direct competition, may make enforcers and courts hesitant or
unwilling to prevent an incumbent from acquiring or excluding a nascent
threat. A hesitant enforcer might insist on strong proof that the competitor, if
left alone, probably would have grown into a full-fledged rival, yet in so doing,
neglect an important category of anticompetitive behavior.
In this Article, we identify nascent competition as a distinct analytical
category and outline a program of antitrust enforcement to protect it. Nascent
competition means different things to different people. Our approach
emphasizes prospective innovation by a future direct competitor. We consider
both exclusionary conduct and acquisitions, with a particular focus on the
latter. We confine ourselves to liability and bracket questions of remedy.
We favor an enforcement policy that prohibits anticompetitive conduct that
is reasonably capable of contributing significantly to the maintenance of the
incumbent’s market power.4 That approach implies enforcement even where
the competitive significance of the nascent competitor is uncertain.
Uncertainty is a ground for caution, but we argue that the overall balance favors
a bias to action, given the importance of the innovation at issue and resulting
costs of underenforcement. The proper approach does not require proving, as
some have argued, that successful competitive entry in the “but-for” world by
the excluded innovator would necessarily or probably have occurred. Such a
standard is not compelled by the relevant case law and serves no clear policy
related to the goals of antitrust. Instead, it would lead the law to miss out on
obvious efforts to destroy competition, and also create a perverse incentive for
threatened incumbents to accelerate their anticompetitive programs.5
The acquisition of a nascent competitor raises several particularly
challenging questions of policy and doctrine. First, acquisition can serve as an
important exit for investors in a small company, and thereby attract capital
necessary for innovation. Blocking or deterring too many acquisitions would
be undesirable. However, the significance of this concern should not be
exaggerated, for our proposed approach is very far from a general ban on the
acquisition of unproven companies. We would discourage, at most, acquisition
by the firm or firms most threatened by a nascent rival. Profitable acquisitions
by others would be left alone, as would the acquisition of merely
complementary or other nonthreatening firms. While wary of the potential
for overenforcement, we believe that scrutiny of the most troubling

See infra Section II.A.
See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79 (describing a monopolist’s incentive, if a diﬀerent and more
stringent standard were employed, “to take more and earlier anticompetitive action”).
4
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acquisitions of unproven firms must be a key ingredient of a competition
enforcement agenda that takes innovation seriously.
Second, as a matter of enforcement practice, the question of how to
distinguish harmful from harmless acquisitions is important and sometimes
diﬃcult. Many acquisitions have important procompetitive justiﬁcations or
are harmless overall. A small, unproven ﬁrm might be acquired in order to
acquire expertise, to add a speciﬁc technical capability, or to make a bet on a
“moon shot”—a risky, unproven technology in another market. Identifying
anticompetitive conduct is a familiar and pervasive problem in antitrust
enforcement, but it is heightened by the uncertainties associated with
innovation and technological change.
We think evidence of an anticompetitive plan is a particularly important
guide in this area.6 Such intent might be subjectively expressed through
testimony or internal writings. The enforcer or factﬁnder essentially borrows
a party’s expertise to help form a judgment about competitive eﬀects.
Alternatively, intent might be revealed through conduct, such as paying too
much for a rival (unless the anticompetitive beneﬁts are taken into account)
or a broader pattern of buying nascent competitors.
Third, uncertainty and product evolution also inﬂuence the timing of
antitrust intervention, whether for exclusionary conduct or acquisitions.7
Where nascent competitors are concerned, agencies can intervene early—
before an acquisition closes or, in an exclusion case, when evidence of
exclusion ﬁrst surfaces. Given the inherent informational limits when it
comes to nascent competitors, however, it can sometimes be better to wait.8
At a minimum, the passage of time should not be disqualifying.
Waiting often permits enforcers to acquire critical information that is
unavailable at an earlier period. Enforcers can uncover the true intent of the
conduct, as hidden information comes to light or (more prosaically) as
multiple bad acts gradually fill in an overall picture. They may also learn about
the adverse effect of the conduct, including the plausible potency of the
nascent competitor and the durable market power of the incumbent. Making
use of such new information does not indulge in unwarranted hindsight bias.
These benefits often offset the costs of waiting, including the disruption
associated with some ex post remedies. Our emphasis on stronger ex post
enforcement offers an alternative to recent proposals emphasizing the need for
new ex ante regulation.9
See infra Section III.A.
Cf. Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement if Innovation Mattered Most, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 325-28 (2012) (emphasizing the importance of timing).
8 See infra Section III.B.
9 See, e.g., JASON FURMAN ET AL., DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING
DIGITAL COMPETITION 2 (Mar. 13, 2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
6
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I deﬁnes what we mean by
nascent competitors and provides paradigmatic examples. Part II sets out and
defends our overall approach to protecting nascent competition and analyzes
its ﬁt with existing antitrust law. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits
certain anticompetitive acquisitions, is a particularly useful tool where the
nascent competitor already has a presence in the incumbent’s market. We
argue that Section 2 of the Sherman Act is also an eﬀective enforcement tool
in the context of incumbents with monopoly power. Here, the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion in United States v. Microsoft provides a helpful framework. Part III
assesses several types of evidence that are important components of an
antitrust enforcement program aimed at protecting nascent competition from
anticompetitive acquisitions.
I. WHAT IS A NASCENT COMPETITOR?
As we use the term, a nascent competitor is a ﬁrm whose innovation
represents a serious, albeit not completely certain, future threat to an
incumbent. We begin by presenting several real-world examples of nascent
competition, then turn to an explication of the key features of our deﬁnition.
A. Examples
Operating systems for personal computers. In the 1990s, Microsoft identified
an emergent threat to its Windows operating system monopoly. The rise of
Netscape’s Internet browser was central to a paradigm shift that threatened
Microsoft’s dominance. This threat was amplified by Sun’s development of the
Java programming language and Intel-developed hardware that was designed
for use with Java. Microsoft CEO Bill Gates catalogued these threats in
internal communications, most famously the “Internet Tidal Wave” memo
that ultimately provided a road map to the antitrust case against the firm.10
Netscape and Sun posed a nascent competitive threat. Neither were
plausibly, at the time, substitutes for Windows. Netscape’s oﬀering did not

uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_revie
w_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/59LL-9VAR] [hereinafter FURMAN REPORT] (recommending new ex
ante rules for digital platforms); GEORGE J. STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. AND
THE STATE, UNIV. OF CHI. BOOTH SCH. OF BUS., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE
STUDY OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS MARKET STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE 9
(2019), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/market-structure-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GQ8E-MWKZ] (recommending the creation of a new regulatory agency for
digital platforms).
10 Memorandum from Bill Gates, Chairman and CEO of Microsoft Corp., to Exec. Staff and Direct
Reports, Microsoft Corp. (May 26, 1995), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/
2006/03/03/20.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8CX-ZDFQ].
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compete with Windows.11 However, Microsoft feared that over time they
would evolve into substitutes,12 and acted to neutralize the competitive threat.
DNA sequencing. Illumina is the leading manufacturer of instruments that
identify the order of nucleotides in a DNA sample, with a market share of 80
percent or more.13 A second firm, PacBio, also makes sequencing equipment.
PacBio uses a “long read” technology in contrast to Illumina’s “short read”
technology.14 Historically, long read sequencing has been less cost-effective on
a cost per genome basis, but over time, the cost and throughput of long-read
technology have improved.15 By 2018, according to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), PacBio had become an increasing threat to Illumina’s
monopoly, with the expectation of further convergence to come.16 Thus,
PacBio posed a nascent threat to Illumina, which Illumina sought to eliminate
by acquiring PacBio.
Social network services. In 2012, Facebook was the world’s leading social
network provider.17 Facebook in the 2010s, like Microsoft in the 1990s,
carefully scanned the horizon for nascent threats that might displace it.18
CEO Mark Zuckerberg observed the rise of popular new social networks that
centered on mobile devices, such as Instagram, a fast-growing photo sharing
11 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53-54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam)
(assessing the perceived threat to Windows posed by Netscape’s browser).
12 See id. at 54 (describing “middleware technologies that threatened to become viable
substitutes for Windows”).
13 See Maxx Chatsko, What Happens Next for Illumina and Pacific Biosciences?, MOTLEY FOOL
(Dec. 28, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/12/28/what-happens-next-forillumina-and-paciﬁc-bioscie.aspx (“Illumina boasts an 80% market share of the global next
generation sequencing (NGS) market, making it the undisputed king of reading genomes.”); see also
Complaint at 6, Illumina, Inc., No. 9387 (F.T.C. ﬁled Dec. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Illumina
Complaint] (alleging market share greater than 90%).
14 See David McLaughlin & Kristen V. Brown, U.S. Moves to Block DNA-Sequencing Deal on
Competition Fears, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2019, 4:08 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-12-17/u-s-moves-to-block-dna-sequencing-merger-on-competition-fears
[https://perma.cc/93LG-YZX5] (describing the two technologies).
15 See Shanika L. Amarasinghe et al., Opportunities and Challenges in Long-Read Sequencing Data Analysis,
21 GENOME BIOLOGY, 2020, at 2, https://genomebiology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13059-0201935-5 [https://perma.cc/DS8H-YUV9 ] (describing this trend).
16 Illumina Complaint, supra note 13, at 7.
17 See Presentation of Sheryl Sandberg, COO of Facebook, Inc., to Vodafone Board of Directors
2 (Jan. 30, 2012), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/00057113_picture.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MW4R-9MB7] (stating that “[t]he industry consolidates as it matures” and “Facebook is now 95% of
all social media in the US”); see also Alexis Madrigal, The Fall of Facebook, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2014,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/12/the-fall-of-facebook/382247 [https://perma.cc/
725F-KDPS] (“A decade after Facebook emerged from the Ivy League dorms in which it started, it is
the most powerful information gatekeeper the world has ever known.”).
18 See Sam Schechner & Parmy Olson, Facebook Feared WhatsApp Threat Ahead of 2014 Purchase,
Documents Show, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 6, 2019, 6:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebookfeared-whatsapp-threat-ahead-of-2014-purchase-documents-show-11573075742 [https://perma.cc/
5YTG-SGLG] (describing competitive surveillance of other ﬁrms).
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app.19 Zuckerberg wrote: “The businesses are nascent but the networks are
established, the brands are already meaningful and if they grow to a large
scale they could be very disruptive to us.”20 He proposed “going after one or
two of them”21 and explained the case for acquisition as a combination of
“neutralizing a competitor” and improving Facebook’s services.22 Instagram
posed a nascent competitive threat, and later that year, Facebook acquired the
ﬁrm for about $1 billion.23
By 2014, Facebook executives regarded messaging apps as “the biggest
competitive threat we face as a business.”24 Zuckerberg wrote colleagues, in
an echo of the Tidal Wave memo, that messaging apps “are trying to build
social networks and replace us.”25 WhatsApp, a leading messaging app, was a
particular focus of these concerns. One senior executive wrote that
“WhatsApp launching a competing platform is deﬁnitely something I’m
super-paranoid about.”26
WhatsApp posed a nascent competitive threat. In 2014, it was not a fullyfledged social network. The competitive concern was that WhatsApp might

19 Instagram reached forty million users in eighteen months. Matt Burns, Instagram’s User
Count Now at 40 Million, Saw 10 Million New Users in Last 10 Days, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 13, 2012),
https://techcrunch.com/2012/04/13/instagrams-user-count-now-at-40-million-saw-10-million-newusers-in-last-10-days [https://perma.cc/6UNW-K29K].
20 Email from Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and CEO of Facebook, Inc., to David Ebersman,
CFO of Facebook, Inc. (Feb. 27, 2012), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedﬁles/
0006322000063223.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B6V-S42E].
21 Id.
22 Email
from David Ebersman to Mark Zuckerberg (Feb. 28, 2012),
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedﬁles/0006322000063223.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4B6V-S42E]
(suggesting, as motivations for an acquisition, “(1) neutralize a potential competitor? . . . (3) integrate
their products with ours in order to improve our service?”); Email from Mark Zuckerberg to David
Ebersman (Feb. 28, 2012), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedﬁles/0006322000063223.pdf (“It’s a
combination of (1) and (3).”). In this exchange, Ebersman expressed skepticism that the
neutralization strategy would work, given the likelihood that other ﬁrms would arise to take its place.
Zuckerberg responded:

One thing that may make (1) more reasonable here is that there are network eﬀects
around social products and a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent social mechanics to invent.
Once someone wins at a speciﬁc mechanic, it’s diﬃcult for others to supplant them
without doing something diﬀerent. It’s possible someone beats Instagram by building
something that is better to the point that they get network migration, but this is harder
as long as Instagram keeps running as a product.
Id.
23 Evelyn Rusli, Facebook Buys Instagram for $1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 2012. Part of the
purchase price was in stock, and the ﬁnal transaction value was lower.
24 Schechner, supra note 18 (quoting Javier Olivan, Facebook’s head of growth).
25 Id.
26 Id. (quoting Mike Vernal, a senior Facebook executive).
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“morph into Facebook” over time.27 Facebook acquired WhatsApp for $22
billion, thereby eliminating the threat.28
B. Significance and Definition
Our deﬁnition of nascent competition has three components, drawn from
the facts and reasoning of Microsoft. There, the court’s understanding that
Netscape was a “nascent . . . competitor” had three important features:
(1) that the Netscape browser held promise as the foundation of an innovative
new software development platform; (2) that the potential of Netscape’s
innovation had not fully come to fruition but might have done so in the
future; and (3) that this prospect posed a serious threat to Windows.
Innovation. First, a nascent competitor is an innovator. Innovation can
take the form of technical progress or new business models that better serve
consumer needs. Protecting the fruits of innovation is important because new
products and services drive economic growth. Such competition is valuable
both because the entrant’s product may represent a real advance and because
the entrant increases the pressure on the incumbent to innovate in
anticipation or response.29 Competition also opens the door to further entry
in this and other businesses. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, competition
can beneﬁt consumers by lowering the price paid for these innovations.
Over the last century and a half, small, innovative ﬁrms have played a
particularly important role in the process of innovation and competition. This
is not to discount the important history of innovation at big ﬁrms with large
research laboratories, such as Bell Labs, Xerox PARC, and research labs at
General Electric and Merck.30 However, over the same period, a signiﬁcant
number of disruptive innovations—those that transform industry—have
come out of very small ﬁrms with new technologies unproven at the time:
examples include the Bell Telephone Company, RCA, MCI, Genentech,
Apple, Netscape, and dozens of others.31
Id. (quoting Olivan).
Id. (noting the completion of the transaction for approximately $22 billion).
Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N., HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 6.4 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 HMG], https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-mergerguidelines-08192010 [https://perma.cc/CQ5M-8PDD] (describing, as possible eﬀects from a
horizontal merger, a “reduced incentive to continue with an existing product-development eﬀort
or . . . to initiate development of new products”).
30 See generally JON GERTNER, THE IDEA FACTORY: BELL LABS AND THE GREAT AGE OF
AMERICAN INNOVATION (2013); FRAN HAWTHORNE, THE MERCK DRUGGERNAUT: THE
INSIDE STORY OF A PHARMACEUTICAL GIANT (2005); MICHAEL A. HILTZIK, DEALERS OF
LIGHTNING: XEROX PARC AND THE DAWN OF THE COMPUTER AGE (2000).
31 Small and large ﬁrms have diﬀerent advantages and disadvantages when it comes to
innovation: the relevant point here is that both have been, over history, important contributors. See
TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 19-20 (2010).
27
28
29
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There is a particular competitive significance of the big innovations at the
smaller firms, for they also represent competitive entry, and sometimes completely
transform the industry.32 New, unproven innovators are a key source of
disruptive innovation.33 Consider that Bell’s telephone did not improve the
telegraph, but replaced it, or the impact of Apple’s personal computer on the
computing industry. As this suggests, nascent competitors can hold the promise
of offering fresh competition for the market, not just in the market. They have the
capacity to displace an incumbent through a paradigm shift—for example, a new
platform for developing software or decoding a genome. Nascent competition
tends to be important in industries marked by rapid innovation and technological
change. Software, pharmaceuticals, mobile telephony, e-commerce, search, and
social network services are leading examples.
Future potency. Second, a nascent competitor is relevant due to its promise
of future innovation. Its potency is not yet fully developed and hence
unproven. Whether that innovation will make a diﬀerence in the marketplace
is subject to signiﬁcant uncertainty. That is due to the unpredictable rate and
direction of technological change. This uncertainty stems from the same
forces of technological progress that make innovation so valuable. The
nascent competitor may fail in various ways: the unproven cure, despite
highest hopes, may ﬂunk its clinical trials; the technologies thought to be the
future might, in fact, be overrated. This uncertainty may not be a quantiﬁable
risk, like the odds in a casino, but closer to Knightian true uncertainty—in
other words, not readily susceptible to measurement.34
The unpredictable path of innovation often results in product plasticity,
in which products evolve and are used for purposes diﬀerent than the original.
For example, in the 1990s, mobile telephones gained popularity as a
complement to a wired telephone, as a means for making calls on the go.35
Today, they compete with land lines, cameras, computers, televisions, and
credit cards. General purpose technologies such as computing and Internet
connectivity act as powerful fuel for unpredictable change.36 Uncertainty
See id. at 18-22, 159.
Cf. Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave,
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 43-44 (“[M]ost well-managed, established companies . . . are
rarely in the forefront of commercializing new technologies that don’t initially meet the needs of
mainstream customers . . . .”).
34 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 232-33 (1957) (noting that the “practical
difference between . . . risk and uncertainty . . . is that in the former, the distribution of the outcome in
a group of instances is known,” whereas “true uncertainty” is “not susceptible to measurement”).
35 Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial
Mobile Services, 68 Fed. Reg. 730, 736 (Jan. 7, 2003) (“Historically, most consumers used their mobile
phones as a mobile complement to their wireline phones by using their mobile handsets only when
away from their homes or places of work.”).
36 See generally Timothy F. Bresnahan & Manuel Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies:
“Engines of Growth”?, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83 (1995).
32
33
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about what products the incumbent and the nascent competitor will actually
oﬀer in the future has a further consequence—uncertainty about the degree
to which those products will actually compete.
In some cases, a nascent competitor may already have begun to compete
in the incumbent’s market, even if its potency is not yet fully proven. For
example, at the time of its announced acquisition, PacBio competed with
Illumina for sequencing business, and Instagram competed with Facebook for
the attention of social network users.37 Existing competition, where present,
may be merely partial: the Netscape browser competed with Microsoft’s
browser but not (yet) with Windows.
Where competition has already begun, its existence might inform a
positive prediction about future competition. In addition, a particular
acquisition might be challenged on account of lost current competition.
However, current competition is not an essential feature of nascent
competition. It is the further, future developments that give nascent
competition its distinctive importance.38
Threat to the incumbent. Finally, a nascent competitor poses a serious threat
to the incumbent. The owner of a tech platform, focused on holding on to its
position, may continually scan the horizon for dangerous new technologies or
fast-growing ﬁrms that might evolve into competitive threats. Microsoft in
the 1990s and Facebook in the 2010s are good examples of ﬁrms that were
highly concerned with their own displacement.
The prospect of disruptive competition for the market raises the stakes,
intensifying an incumbent’s attentiveness to the risk of being usurped. Some
incumbents are particularly aware of this possibility, having been the
See Tim Wu, Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 771, 774-76 (2019).
Our deﬁnition matches the usage of the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft, which viewed Netscape
as a nascent competitor even though Netscape did not oﬀer current competition to Windows. United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam); see also United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (“It is the ‘contract, combination . . .
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce’ which § 1 of the Act strikes down, whether the
concerted activity be wholly nascent or abortive on the one hand, or successful, on the other.”). An
alternative deﬁnition requires some degree of current competition. See, e.g., Paul T. Denis, Partner,
Dechert LLP, Address at the Fed. Trade Comm’n Hearing on Competition and Consumer
Protection in the 21st Century: Nascent Competition: Is the Current Analytical Framework
Suﬃcient?, at 187 (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/ﬁles/documents/public_events/
1413712/ftc_hearings_session_3_transcript_day_3_10-17-18_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YNJ-X29E]
(acknowledging “common usage [of] the term . . . to refer to competition that we’ve yet to see” but
criticizing this deﬁnition as “incorrect” because “[t]he word itself implies some degree of
competition that’s present but . . . not yet fully realized”); see also Competition in Digital Technology
Markets: Examining Acquisitions of Nascent or Potential Competitors by Digital Platforms: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
116th Cong. 2 (2019) (statement of John M. Yun, Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Yun%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/46JGJ5PJ] (adopting and paraphrasing Denis’s view).
37
38
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beneﬁciary of such a paradigm shift at an earlier time: consider that
Microsoft, for example, replaced the CP/M operating system when
computing moved from microcomputers to personal computers. Not every
technology that poses a future threat is perfectly obvious on its face. A
technology might stay complementary in one ﬁrm’s hands, but in the hands
of another, provide a foothold for evolution into a substitute.
* * *
Our deﬁnition of nascent competition is restrictive in certain respects. It
leaves out future competition where innovation plays no major role39 or is
uncertain for reasons unrelated to the rate and direction of technological
change.40 Such cases might concern “nascent competition” in a broad sense
and merit protection from antitrust law, depending on the facts. Our
deﬁnition also excludes ﬁrms producing complements that, absent exclusion
or acquisition by the incumbent, might facilitate third-party competition.41
We limit ourselves here to focus on a subset of cases that present important,
real-world challenges for antitrust enforcement.
II. PROTECTING NASCENT COMPETITION
A. Overall Approach
As a matter of antitrust policy, the importance of protecting innovation by
nascent competitors requires searching scrutiny of incumbents’ actions to
neutralize such competition. Nurturing innovation is properly regarded as a
central goal of antitrust enforcement.42 Moreover, as discussed above, new,
unproven innovators are a key source of disruptive innovation.43 Given the
incentive and ability of incumbents to destroy or coopt innovative threats,
We discuss other forms of lost future competition infra Section II.B.
See, e.g., Complaint at 11-12, FTC v. Mallinckrodt ARD Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00120 (D.D.C. Jan. 30,
2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170118mallinckrodt_complaint_public.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SG65-KUA5] (alleging that a U.S. drug maker violated antitrust law by acquiring a lowpriced, chemically similar treatment for same condition, approved in Europe but not the United States).
41 See, e.g., Kevin Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust
Policy, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 331 (2020) (focusing on this issue); Thomas Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 20-21, 33-38), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3665040
(discussing this issue in the context of “adversarial interoperability”); Mark A. Lemley & Andrew
McCreary, Exit Strategy 19 (Stan. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 542, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3506919 [https://perma.cc/Y8EZ-F8LX] (emphasizing Instagram’s
platform agnosticism, which facilitated competition with Facebook by Twitter and others).
42 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Going, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 751 (2011) (“[T]here seems to be broad consensus that the gains to be had from
innovation are larger than the gains from simple production and trading under constant technology.”).
43 See supra Section I.A.
39
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avoiding that outcome is an important target for enforcement. The risk of lost
innovation strongly tips the balance in favor of a bias to action.
We favor an enforcement policy that prohibits anticompetitive conduct
that is reasonably capable of contributing signiﬁcantly to the maintenance of
the incumbent’s market power. That approach is not only consistent with
antitrust law, but directly drawn from Microsoft,44 the leading example of
antitrust enforcement to preserve nascent competition. This approach
implies a particular decision rule. Where an incumbent (1) eliminates or
impedes a nascent competitor through acquisition or exclusion, (2) that poses
the requisite level of competitive threat, and (3) without fully oﬀsetting
competitive beneﬁts, such conduct should be prohibited. Several features of
our approach bear particular note.
Uncertain threats. Notably, the approach does not require proving that
successful competitive entry, in the but-for world, would necessarily have
occurred. Even a modest probability of a highly detrimental outcome is a
large loss, in expected value terms, and ought to be avoided.45 It is therefore
no surprise that the Microsoft court, other courts, and enforcement agencies
have all recognized the antitrust violation that arises even if the competitive
but-for world is highly uncertain or otherwise incompletely speciﬁed.46
We therefore disagree with recent suggestions that an enforcer, to
establish antitrust liability, should be asked to prove that competition in the
but-for world is more likely than not.47 The implication is that, when the
See infra Section II.C (discussing Microsoft in more detail).
See, e.g., FURMAN REPORT, supra note 9, at 13, 99-101 (favoring a “balance of harms” approach
that condemns mergers resulting in harm in expected value terms, and criticizing a more-likely-thannot test as “unduly cautious”); Giulio Federico et al., Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting
Disruption, in 20 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 125, 142-43 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern
eds., 2019) (making a similar point); Doni Bloomfield, Getting to “May Be”: Probability, Potential
Competition, and the Clayton Act 36-47 (June 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589820 (favoring an expected value approach to horizontal mergers); see also
Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16 (concluding that the Supreme Court
adopted an expected consumer harm approach in the evaluation of certain horizontal agreements).
46 See infra Section II.C (discussing case law under Section 2 of the Sherman Act that follows
this approach); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 157 (2013) (concluding that a reduction in the
likelihood—the “risk”—of competition due to certain conduct is a “consequence [that] constitutes
the relevant anticompetitive harm,” even if the likelihood is low); 2010 HMG, supra note 29, § 5.3
(targeting mergers for challenge where “competitive signiﬁcance of the potential entrant” is high);
Michael R. Moiseyev, Potential and Nascent Competition in FTC Merger Enforcement in Health Care
Markets, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2020, at 6 (“The ‘competitive signiﬁcance’ of the entrant
is the product of both its probability of successful entry and its impact if, and when, it occurs.”).
47 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris & Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, First Principles for Review of LongConsummated Mergers, 5 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 29, 30 (2020) (taking this view); Jonathan
Jacobson & Christopher Mufarrige, Acquisitions of “Nascent” Competitors, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2020,
at 1, 13-14, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/2020/august2020/aug20_full_source.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD5D-CYTP] (advocating a “50.01%+” standard in
evaluating acquisitions of nascent competitors).
44
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government observes the elimination of a nascent competitor, it must prove
decisively that, absent the conduct, the competitor would have seized market
share from the incumbent. But the proposed requirement is a transparent
eﬀort to impose an extra and unwarranted burden on the government. Such
a standard is inconsistent with case law and with the core policy goals of
protecting innovation and avoiding anticompetitive harms.
In the economic language of error costs, such an approach fails to manage
costly “false negatives” (harmful clearances) by setting a rule in which the
frequency of false negatives may be low but their size is large. Hobbling
enforcement in this manner would also produce a perverse incentive on the
incumbent’s part, as Microsoft recognized, “to take more and earlier
anticompetitive action.”48
The need for such proof is particularly out of place where evidence
demonstrates the incumbent’s anticompetitive plan. If an acquirer’s
management team holds the considered view that, but for its purchase, the
target would pose a future competitive threat, why should the government be
required to prove that the threat was even clearer and stronger than
management believed?
Our approach, though it addresses competitive threats that had only a
modest probability of materializing, does not apply to every threat, no matter
how remote. We would conﬁne enforcement to conduct that targets serious
threats to the incumbent—in particular, those threats that are reasonably
capable of signiﬁcantly contributing to displacement of the incumbent. For
example, hiring a talented engineer who otherwise might conceivably go on
to build a giant killer doesn’t count; the threat is not far enough along.
Moreover, under our approach, the target must pose an incremental threat. If
a large number of ﬁrms are equally positioned to pose the same competitive
threat, removing one of them is harmless.
Monopoly power. Our proposed approach applies to monopolists and
oligopolists alike. That said, when the threatened incumbent has monopoly
power, concerns about lost competition are heightened in two respects.49 First,
an incumbent with a high market share has a heightened incentive to suppress
an entrant, given that it internalizes most or all of the benefits from doing so.50
Relatedly, the threat places a great deal of value at risk. For the same acquisition
price, as the value at risk rises, the threshold probability of threat needed to
motivate costly anticompetitive conduct falls. Thus, as the size of the acquirer’s
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
See 2010 HMG, supra note 29, § 2.1.5 (noting heightened concern when “one of the merging
ﬁrms has a strong incumbency position and the other merging ﬁrm threatens to disrupt market
conditions with a new technology or business model”).
50 Cf. id. § 5.3 (“The lessening of competition resulting from such a merger is more likely to
be substantial, the larger is the market share of the incumbent . . . .”).
48
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threatened profits increases, the threshold probability goes down. Put another
way, we would expect the biggest firms to chase down the smallest threats.
Second, such an incumbent has a greater capacity to resist and suppress
competition. Its advantages may include superior information about the
threat posed and relationships with suppliers and customers that it can recruit
or coerce into joining its scheme. Meanwhile, the public beneﬁts of
preserving a ﬁrm’s chance to compete for the market may be unusually great,
particularly in markets where there are few or no other candidates available
to challenge the incumbent for the market in the near term,51 and in markets
whose characteristics make competition within the market diﬃcult.52
Acquisitions. Our approach applies equally to exclusionary conduct and the
acquisition of a nascent competitor. Unlike exclusion, the acquisition target
welcomes the attention, but that is hardly a guarantee of public benefit. So-called
“killer acquisitions” are a real-world problem.53 So are deals that leave the
acquired product on the market while removing it as a threat to the existing firm.
It might be argued that acquisitions are diﬀerent because acquisition is an
important means of exit for investors.54 If acquisitions were unduly curbed,
pre-acquisition investments in risky startups might dry up, resulting in lost
innovation. Moreover, synergies might be lost, as incumbents steered clear of
buying and incubating promising new technologies.
These concerns merit attention, but they are not powerful critiques of our
proposed approach, which applies only to deals eliminating a suﬃciently
substantial competitive threat. This is very far from a ban on the acquisition
of small ﬁrms or even a ban on acquisitions by dominant ﬁrms. First, most
deals involve merely complementary or otherwise noncompetitive
technology. Such deals—deals without expectation that the acquired ﬁrm
poses a serious threat of becoming a rival—are not targeted.
Second, most promising ﬁrms that threaten a major incumbent have
multiple suitors. Our suggestion is that, at most, the ﬁrm or ﬁrms most
threatened by the nascent competitor should not be allowed to buy out the
threat. For most acquisition targets, that approach would block acquisition by
(at most) one suitor. Thus, investors can expect a payout even if payment by
51 Cf. id. (“The lessening of competition resulting from such a merger is more likely to be
substantial, . . . the greater is the competitive threat posed by this potential entrant relative to others.”).
52 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 741 (2018)
(“As a general principle, the greater and more durable is the market power of an incumbent ﬁrm,
the larger is the payoﬀ from preventing that ﬁrm from acquiring the smaller ﬁrms that, if left to
grow on their own, would become its strongest challengers.”); Federico et al., supra note 45, at 152,
160 (favoring a more assertive approach under these circumstances).
53 Colleen Cunningham et al., Killer Acquisitions (Apr. 22, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3241707.
54 See Lemley & McCreary, supra note 41 (examining this phenomenon); D. Daniel Sokol, Vertical
Mergers and Entrepreneurial Exit, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1357 (2018) (discussing the motivations for exit).
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the threatened incumbent is blocked. And so, for example, if Google instead
of Facebook had bought WhatsApp, investors would still see a substantial
return with less competitive concern.55 These limits greatly reduce concerns
about overenforcement that might otherwise chill desirable behavior.56 Such
concerns are further reduced if care is taken to avoid false positives, an issue
we return to in Part III.
To be sure, limiting anticompetitive acquisitions will sometimes eliminate
the highest bidder, and to that extent reduces the returns from investing in the
startup in the first place. However, startups are not an end in themselves.
Investments are desirable to the extent that the public actually sees some benefit
from the innovation and competition they provide. Lowered investment in
startups that fail to provide these benefits, because they end up in the hands of
an incumbent, is a feature of antitrust enforcement rather than a bug.
Finally, while removing a suitor may lower the acquisition price in some
instances, all else equal, allowing anticompetitive deals is likely to have this
eﬀect too, and for a larger set of acquisitions. That is because allowing
anticompetitive deals reduces the set of future acquirers. The resulting
reduction in bidders for future startups with complementary technology can
be expected to reduce the purchase price.57
B. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Enforcers have several options for protecting nascent competition,
including Section 7 of the Clayton Act, Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and,
for the FTC, Section 5 of the FTC Act.58 Section 7 applies to acquisitions
and is the standard antitrust tool for drawing the line between dangerous and
benign mergers, prohibiting deals whose eﬀect “may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”59
In some nascent competition cases, a well-crafted Section 7 complaint can
provide an effective enforcement tool. As noted above, sometimes a nascent
55 For an FTC matter raising a similar issue, see Complaint, CDK Global, Inc., No. 9382 (F.T.C.
Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/docket_no_9382_cdk_automate_
part_3_complaint_redacted_public_version_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/GGC2-ELV4] (challenging the
acquisition of a nascent challenger to CDK’s position in a market for car dealership software;
incumbent bought nascent rival based on fears it would otherwise be acquired by a wealthy outsider).
56 Any chilling eﬀect is further diminished if enforcement is conﬁned to acquisitions by
dominant ﬁrms. For further discussion, see infra Section II.C.
57 Cf. Bryan & Hovenkamp, supra note 41, at 344-45 (making the related argument that
bargaining power falls as incumbents exit due to startups shifting their eﬀorts toward technologies
that disproportionately beneﬁt the market leader).
58 Section 5 has a broader scope than Section 2 and might target, for example, a nonmonopolist ﬁrm that abuses government process or engages in egregious predatory conduct to
exclude nascent competitors.
59 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
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competitor has already begun to compete directly in the incumbent’s market.60
In such cases, an enforcer may make use of the presumption of illegality that
applies to horizontal mergers that significantly increase concentration.61
By contrast, where the nascent competitor offers solely future competition,
matters are more complex. Some acquisitions have been challenged under the
so-called potential competition doctrine, an aspect of horizontal merger
doctrine that focuses upon certain forms of anticipated competition between
the two firms.62 To fix ideas, suppose one bank serves customers in Seattle and
another bank serves customers in Spokane.63 The Seattle firm has the interest
and ability to enter and compete in the geographically adjacent Spokane
market. A merger would eliminate this competitive constraint.
The potential competition doctrine is concerned with two distinct forms
of competitive constraint. The ﬁrst version is that potential entry constrains
present pricing. For example, if the Spokane bank recognizes the potential
entry should it decide to raise prices, that prospect tends to constrain its
behavior.64 A merger is unlawful because it removes this constraint. This
version goes by the unfortunate name of “perceived potential competition.”
It is a present constraint on the ﬁrm’s conduct, and hence quite diﬀerent from
the future competition that is the focus of nascent competition.
The second version, called “actual potential competition” (APC), focuses
on the future competitive beneﬁts that would result if the Seattle bank
actually entered the Spokane market. As interpreted by lower courts, such
mergers are actionable only where “the competitor ‘probably’ would have
entered the market [and] its entry would have had pro-competitive eﬀects.”65
Under this interpretation of the law, the acquisition of a nascent competitor
would be nearly impossible to challenge, given the diﬃculty in establishing
the but-for world with suﬃcient precision and certainty. Thus, if this
approach were the exclusive avenue for challenging acquisitions of nascent
competitors, eﬀective enforcement would be impossible.

See supra Section I.B (discussing PacBio and Instagram as examples of actual competition).
See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); 2010 HMG, supra note 29, § 5.3.
See 2010 HMG, supra note 29, § 1 (noting application to “actual or potential competitors”);
see also id. § 2.1.4 (“The Agencies consider whether the merging ﬁrms have been, or likely will
become absent the merger, substantial head-to-head competitors.”).
63 This scenario is drawn from United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
64 Cf. United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 658 (1964) (noting that acquisition
target was already “a substantial factor” in acquirer’s home market at the time of acquisition).
65 FTC v. Steris Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 962, 966 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (quoting FTC’s view of its
burden); see also id. at 978 (accepting this view). The exact language varies. See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Co.
v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1981) (“probably”); Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 352 (2d
Cir. 1982) (“would likely”); Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 638
F.2d 1255, 1268-69 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring a “reasonable probability” of entry, and construing that
test to require more than “probability,” with “probability” requiring a greater than fifty percent chance).
60
61
62
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This unappetizing outcome, however, is not inevitable. APC case law has
developed in a context and with a focus quite diﬀerent from acquisitions of
nascent competitors, and hence is distinguishable. One diﬀerence is that APC
case law has substantially focused on the well-established acquirer as the
potential entrant.66 In this context, the absence of a well-deﬁned plan to enter
might well be informative about the (un)likelihood of future entry. By
contrast, in nascent competition cases, it is the target, a newcomer, that oﬀers
future competition. Here, the absence of clear evidence of future entry is
seldom probative.
A second diﬀerence is that APC case law has ignored innovation. Its focus
is anticipated entry using existing products, by ﬁrms with established
capabilities already selling in related markets (often other geographic
markets).67 For example, the court considers whether the existing bank is
likely to expand its scope, as to a product that it already sells, to a new
geographic market.68
By contrast, as we have emphasized, nascent competition is important
precisely because of its innovative potential. The appropriate analytic focus
is the nature and potential of the unproven competitor’s product, rather than
anticipated competition in existing products from an established ﬁrm. APC
case law has not addressed or wrestled with the distinctive features of
innovation competition, including its unusually important beneﬁts, the
prospect of competition for the market, the distinctive nature of the
uncertainties associated with innovation competition, and the heightened
importance of protecting innovative entrants when the incumbent resisting
innovative displacement is a monopoly. This neglect is a signiﬁcant limitation
on the reach of APC doctrine.

66 See, e.g., Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (considering acquirer bank as potential
competitor in target’s geographic market); United States v. Falstaﬀ Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526
(1973) (considering acquirer brewery as potential competitor in target’s geographic market); Alberta
Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1254 (3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J.,
dissenting) (summarizing APC doctrine as “usually presented” to require that “absent the
acquisition, the acquiring ﬁrm would have entered the market in the near future”); see also Donald
F. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1382 (1965)
(noting the problem of establishing the signiﬁcance of “the loss of the acquiring ﬁrm as an
independent new competitor”).
67 See JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY 151-52 (2019) (concluding that potential competition case law “address[es] the loss through
merger of anticipated rivalry in current products, not the loss of rivalry in innovation or future products”).
68 See, e.g., Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (considering whether a Seattle bank would expand
into Spokane); Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (considering whether a regional brewery would expand
into New England); Yamaha Motor Co., 657 F.2d 971 (considering whether a Japanese outboard motor
producer would expand into the United States); Steris, 133 F. Supp. 3d 962 (considering whether a provider
of x-ray sterilization services in Europe would expand into the United States).
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Relatedly, future innovation often creates uncertainty that the existing APC
case law is not well equipped to handle. APC doctrine emphasizes the fact that
the entrant’s capabilities are fully established.69 In an ordinary APC case, the
consequences of entry may be easy to assess given previous entry episodes by
the same firm or analogous entry by others. For future innovation, these bases
for prediction are generally absent, and the nature of the resulting uncertainty
is generally more resistant to measurement. In the language used above, nascent
competition is characterized by the Knightian uncertainty of an unproven
technology or an emerging ecosystem that may evolve in unexpected directions.
These differences suggest that APC case law should be distinguished in
favor of a distinctive doctrinal approach centered on nascent competition.
Otherwise, the requirements of APC case law ought to be relaxed to take
account of the distinctive features of nascent competition where it is present.70
Such a step is consistent with the text of Section 7, which prohibits
acquisitions whose result merely “may be” anticompetitive harm, and
antitrust’s openness to doctrinal adjustments that are welfare improving.71
C. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
A second tool for protecting nascent competition is Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, which applies to incumbents with monopoly power. This is a
setting in which our concerns about lost competition are heightened, for
reasons discussed in Section II.A.
Section 2 prohibits “monopoliz[ation],”72 and applies to exclusionary
conduct and acquisitions undertaken by defendants with monopoly power to
maintain that power. Section 2 case law implements our proposed approach.
A government enforcer must show that the anticompetitive conduct was
reasonably capable of contributing significantly to the maintenance of market
69 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1121b (4th ed.)
(emphasizing the potential competitor’s “requisite economic capabilities for substantial de novo entry”).
70 To be clear, we are not arguing that such cases asserting lost future innovation are necessarily
impossible to litigate as APC cases under existing law. And indeed, enforcers have used the APC
frame to challenge mergers with a signiﬁcant innovation component. See, e.g., Complaint at 6,
Amgen Inc., No. C-4053 (F.T.C. July 12, 2002) (alleging reduced innovation competition and
reduced potential competition as to certain products under development); Complaint at 9, CibaGeigy Ltd., No. C-3725 (F.T.C. Mar. 24, 1997) (similar).
71 See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 576 U.S. 446, 461 (2015) (explaining the “less-than-usual force”
of stare decisis in antitrust cases). For proposals to alter the existing rules, see Mark Glick &
Catherine Ruetschlin, Big Tech Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine: The Case of Facebook
6-7 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking Working Paper No. 104, Oct. 2019); Bloomﬁeld, supra note 45,
at 57-62 (proposing a presumption of illegality for certain acquisitions of potential competitors);
John E. Kwoka, Non-Incumbent Competition: Mergers Involving Constraining and Prospective
Competitors, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173 (2001) (urging focus on a ﬁrm’s technological capability
to become a competitor).
72 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
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power. This point bears emphasis: the government need not establish that
absent the deal, successful entry was more likely than not to occur.73
An important illustration is the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Microsoft. There
the court reviewed a district court determination of liability for unlawful
maintenance of monopoly. A central fact in the litigation, discussed previously,
was that the competitive threat posed by Netscape was not fully fledged.
Netscape made browsers, not operating systems. It had not developed into a real
competitor to Windows and might never have done so. That fact, however, was
not an insuperable barrier to antitrust enforcement. As the court explained,
“[n]othing in § 2 . . . limits its prohibition to actions taken against threats that
are already well-developed enough to serve as present substitutes.”74
The court adopted a rule of reason-like approach to the assessment of
anticompetitive conduct that culminated in a balancing of anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects. Two types of anticompetitive conduct satisfy the court’s
test: conduct that lacks any procompetitive justification, and conduct that is
anticompetitive on balance, taking into account a partly offsetting procompetitive
justification.75 Balancing is not some minor feature of the court’s approach to
Section 2, but an important part of its enduring influence.76 Applying this
approach, the court held that twelve acts were anticompetitive and lacked any
procompetitive justification. The court conducted balancing as to several other
aspects of Microsoft’s conduct, and determined that they were not unlawful.77
Later in its opinion, the court gave separate consideration to causation.
The court noted the absence of any ﬁnding that Netscape would have
“developed into [a] serious enough cross-platform threat” to erode
Microsoft’s market power.78 Microsoft had argued that DOJ never proved
that, absent the challenged conduct, more competition would have resulted.

73 See C. Scott Hemphill, Disruptive Incumbents: Platform Competition in an Age of Machine
Learning, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1984-87 (2019) (discussing the use of Section 2 to challenge the
elimination of nascent competition).
74 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
75 Id. at 59.
76 See, e.g., Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Hearing on
Section 2 of the Sherman Act: The Consumer Reigns: Using Section 2 to Ensure a “Competitive
Kingdom”
(June
20,
2006),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/deborah-platt-majoras-remarks
[https://perma.cc/NAG9-WQ9X] (applauding Microsoft’s “weighted balancing” approach).
77 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 63 (concluding, as to a ban on user interfaces that replaced the Windows
desktop, that a cognizable justiﬁcation—preventing the “drastic alteration of Microsoft’s copyrighted
work”—“outweighs the marginal anticompetitive eﬀect”); id. at 67 (concluding, as to product design
overriding the user choice of default browser, that Microsoft’s justiﬁcation should be credited, and
that DOJ had failed to show that the anticompetitive eﬀect outweighed this justiﬁcation); see also
New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 144 (D.D.C. 2002) (treating the D.C. Circuit’s
analysis of incompatible Java as conduct where the procompetitive eﬀect was “found to outweigh”
the anticompetitive eﬀect).
78 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79.
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The court rejected this argument as setting too high a bar, holding that only
a “rather edentulous” causation test applied.79
This “toothless” test requires merely that the “exclusion of nascent threats
is the type of conduct that is reasonably capable of contributing signiﬁcantly”
to monopoly maintenance, and that the targets of exclusion “reasonably
constituted nascent threats.”80 On the same page of its opinion, the court
oﬀered, as a virtually identical formulation, that causation may be inferred
from conduct that “reasonably appear[s] capable of making a signiﬁcant
contribution to . . . maintaining monopoly power.”81
This understanding of Microsoft’s causation holding is widely accepted.82
Courts and enforcers have followed the D.C. Circuit’s lead.83 The scope of this
holding is subject to debate. But at a minimum, it applies to conduct targeting
a nascent competitor in order to maintain a monopoly, challenged as a
violation of § 2 in a government enforcement action seeking equitable relief.84
To be clear, Microsoft’s causation holding applies only to liability, not
remedy.85 A government enforcer may establish liability without proving that
the conduct actually made a real difference in maintaining monopoly power.
The court expressly and repeatedly contrasted the required showing to the
higher showing that would be needed to support a remedy such as divestiture.86
Critics of this approach have denied that Microsoft’s causation holding
applies to acquisitions of nascent competitors, but their arguments are not
persuasive. First, critics argue that Microsoft causation applies “by its terms”
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 69).
See, e.g., 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS § 2C
(8th ed. 2017) (stating that Microsoft “held that courts can infer causation from the fact that a
defendant has engaged in anticompetitive conduct that ‘reasonably appear[s] capable of making a
signiﬁcant contribution to . . . maintaining monopoly power’”).
83 See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 833 (11th Cir. 2015) (“To prevail, the FTC must
establish that McWane has engaged in anti-competitive conduct that reasonably appears to be a
significant contribution to maintaining monopoly power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Unlawful maintenance of a
monopoly is demonstrated by proof that a defendant has engaged in anti-competitive conduct that
reasonably appears to be a significant contribution to maintaining monopoly power.”); Illumina
Complaint, supra note 13, at 12 (“The Acquisition is anticompetitive conduct reasonably capable of
contributing significantly to Illumina’s maintenance of monopoly power.”). As these examples
suggest, some courts use a slightly different verbal formulation—that the conduct reasonably appears
to make a significant contribution.
84 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam)
(articulating rule for “§ 2 liability in an equitable enforcement action” (emphasis omitted)).
85 Id. (limiting attention to “§ 2 liability in an equitable enforcement action”).
86 Id. at 80 (requiring a stronger causal connection at the remedy stage to provide “some
measure of conﬁdence that there has been an actual loss to competition that needs to be restored”);
id. at 106 (insisting on “suﬃcient causal connection,” not yet established, between conduct and
maintenance of monopoly in order to support certain remedies).
79
80
81
82
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only where the defendant’s conduct lacks any procompetitive justiﬁcation.87
Even if correct, Microsoft causation would still apply to a deal that lacked such
a justiﬁcation, such as a transaction that lacked a merger-speciﬁc, veriﬁable
eﬃciency. The textual basis for the critics’ contention is the phrase
“undesirable conduct” in this sentence of the court’s opinion: “[t]o some
degree, ‘the defendant is made to suﬀer the uncertain consequences of its own
undesirable conduct.’”88 The idea is that “undesirable conduct” is limited to
conduct “bereft of any procompetitive rationale.”89
However, the Microsoft opinion is not so conﬁned. By referring broadly to
“undesirable conduct,” the court did not rule out conduct that was undesirable
on balance. The court’s causation analysis and holding are framed generally,
rather than narrowly limited.90 To be sure, the court did not actually condemn
any conduct after balancing. However, each type of conduct was evaluated
within a balancing framework that clearly contemplated the identiﬁcation of
anticompetitive conduct with partly oﬀsetting procompetitive aspects.91
Narrowing the scope of Microsoft to omit conduct that is anticompetitive on
balance would abandon an important aspect of the case’s enduring inﬂuence.
Second, critics argue that the analysis is controlled by a later D.C. Circuit
case.92 In Rambus Inc. v. FTC, the court rejected an FTC challenge to
deceptive conduct in the standard setting process, concluding that the FTC
had “failed to demonstrate that Rambus’s conduct was exclusionary.”93
However, Rambus analyzed a different form of monopolizing conduct—
monopoly acquisition, rather than maintenance.94 It also addressed a different
87 Muris & Nuechterlein, supra note 47, at 39 (arguing that Microsoft causation “applies by its
terms only to exclusionary conduct lacking any procompetitive justiﬁcation—and thus not to typical
mergers, particularly those that were reviewed by the government itself before consummation”);
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Challenging Consummated Mergers Under Section 2,
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (May 3, 2020), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/
challenging-consummated-mergers-under-section-2-2 [https://perma.cc/59Q9-HF6D] (arguing
that Microsoft causation “applies by its terms only to exclusionary conduct lacking any procompetitive
justiﬁcation—and, therefore, not to the typical merger, particularly if it was reviewed and approved
by the Department of Justice (‘DoJ’) or the FTC itself before consummation”).
88 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79 (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 69).
89 Muris & Nuechterlein, supra note 47, at 40.
90 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79. Nor does the quoted source, the Areeda–Hovenkamp treatise, use
the phrase “undesirable conduct” in the narrow fashion urged by critics.
91 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., Ginsburg & Wong-Ervin, supra note 87 (“In Rambus v. FTC—a Section 2 case the
D.C. Circuit decided after Microsoft—the court held that the agency failed to prove that ‘but-for’
the defendant’s conduct, there would have been harm to the competitive process.”).
93 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
94 See Avishalom Tor, Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions of Dominance or Monopoly Power,
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 847, 848-49 (2010) (discussing heightened false positive concerns in monopoly
acquisition cases); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 69, at ¶ 803a (concluding that
“evidence of causation is particularly critical” in monopoly acquisition cases).
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question: whether the conduct actually excluded a rival, as opposed to (as in
the causation discussion of Microsoft) whether such exclusion had a competitive
consequence.95 These differences make it particularly unlikely that the panel
opinion in Rambus silently overruled Microsoft’s en banc holding on causation.
Finally, critics seek to weaponize the fact that Section 7 was enacted as a
plaintiff-friendly enforcement tool. If Section 7 has a lower bar than Section
2, and Section 7 requires a clear demonstrated harm to competition, it must
then be the case, the argument goes, that the Section 2 hurdle is equally high.
The problem here is that, as discussed in the previous Section, judicial
interpretations of Section 7 are too demanding. There is no good reason to
extend this error to Section 2. This argument is also flatly contrary to
Microsoft’s causation holding.
The typical monopolization case, illustrated by Microsoft, focuses on
exclusionary conduct. However, Section 2 also reaches acquisitions.96 One
famous example of monopolization through acquisition was the consolidation
of market power by Standard Oil.97 If Microsoft had sought to acquire
Netscape simply in order to eliminate a competitive threat, that deal would
violate Section 2.98 Such an acquisition would be unlawful, just like analogous
exclusionary conduct, even though future competition from Netscape was an
uncertain and merely probabilistic prospect. Otherwise we would face the
95 See Ankur Kapoor, What Is the Standard of Causation of Monopoly?, ANTITRUST, Summer
2009, at 38, 40 (making this point).
96 See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 69, at ¶ 912b (concluding that the acquisition
of a nascent rival “tends to maintain a monopoly by cutting oﬀ an avenue of future competition
before it has had a chance to develop” and thereby violates Section 2).
97 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 73-75 (1911) (agreeing with the court
below that the 1899 consolidation of control in Standard Oil of New Jersey “operated to destroy the
‘potentiality of competition’ which otherwise would have existed”). The Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court’s conclusion that this conduct violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 72-77.
98 In fact, at one point, Microsoft apparently approached Netscape about buying or licensing
Netscape’s browser code. Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Findings of Fact ¶ 64.1, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 98-1232), https://www.justice.gov/atr/us-v-microsoftproposed-findings-fact-1 (citing deposition testimony of a Microsoft executive describing the 1994
overture, prior to Microsoft’s full recognition of the browser threat, to license Netscape browser
software); id. ¶ 64.2 (quoting a Netscape executive’s testimony that Microsoft had “offered a flat fee of a
couple of million dollars to take us out of the game[, which] would have killed our product in their
space”). Microsoft later sought a market allocation arrangement in which Netscape would cease
competing for PC-compatible browser business. Id. ¶ 67 (describing evidence of a June 1995 meeting in
which Microsoft proposed that Netscape not develop a browser for Windows 95); see also Microsoft, 84 F.
Supp. 2d at 30-33 (describing efforts to “[d]issuade Netscape from [d]eveloping Navigator as a
[p]latform”); Email from Bill Gates to Paul Maritz (May 31, 1995, 1:17 PM),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/03/03/22.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EGL-PV99]
(“I think there is a very powerful deal of some kind we can do with Netscape. . . . I would really like to
see something like this happen!!”). Microsoft also discussed internally the possibility of investing in
Netscape. Id. (“Of course over time we will compete on servers but we can help them a lot in the
meantime. We could even pay them money as part of the deal buying some piece of them or something.”).
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absurd result that a ﬁrm with monopoly power could freely acquire rather
than exclude its nascent rivals.
The Section 2 approach that we describe here is limited to incumbents
with monopoly power.99 This is precisely the subset of cases in which, as we
explain above, vigorous protection of nascent competition is particularly
important.100 Some observers wary of broad enforcement may regard this as
a helpful limiting principle.
A signiﬁcant feature of Section 2 enforcement, beyond its treatment of
uncertain threats, is that it positions a court to collectively evaluate a larger
set of acts. Section 7, by contrast, is directed to the scrutiny of a single
acquisition. The broad aperture of Section 2 matters because the cumulative
eﬀect of multiple acts is greater than a single act. Consider, as a hypothetical
example, the dominant player who faces a series of ten nascent competitors,
each of which has a 10% chance of displacing it. By acquiring them all, the
incumbent eliminates a set of competitive forces that collectively had a strong
chance of displacing the incumbent.101 In this example, liability may be found
even if (contrary to our view) a more-likely-than-not harm must be shown.102
Under a Section 2 approach, the target need not participate in the market
dominated by the incumbent. This feature is not unique to Section 2. The same
is true if a Section 2-type approach is pursued within a Section 7 merger
challenge. Section 7 is not limited to horizontal mergers; the statute prohibits
transactions that “tend to create a monopoly,”103 which includes the acquisition
of a nascent competitor not currently in the same market as the acquirer. An
enforcer is therefore free to sue under Section 7, arguing that the acquisition
improperly tends to preserve the incumbent’s monopoly power. In such a case,
the presumption of illegality would not apply. Case law on this use of Section 7
is scant. The analysis would center upon an evaluation of market power and
competitive effects, and thus roughly track the contours of a Section 2 inquiry.104

99 Our focus is maintenance of monopoly. An alternative approach under § 2 is to challenge an
acquisition as an unlawful attempt to monopolize. That route may be appropriate where existing
monopoly power is not clearly established and the evidence demonstrates a specific intent to monopolize.
100 See supra Section II.A.
101 For example, if the probabilities of success by nascent competitors are independent, the
collective probability that at least one would succeed is 1 - 0.910, or approximately 65%. Cf. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) (aggregating foreclosure effect of multiple firms).
102 We thank Mark Lemley for suggesting this point. Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (describing without endorsing DOJ’s course-ofconduct theory of liability).
103 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
104 Cf. Scott A. Sher, Closed but Not Forgotten: Government Review of Consummated Mergers
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41, 65 (2004) (arguing that Section 2
grants greater latitude to challenge acquisitions based on later market conditions).
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III. IDENTIFYING ANTICOMPETITIVE ACQUISITIONS
We now take a closer look at what an antitrust case premised on exclusion
through acquisition might look like as a practical matter.
When an incumbent acquires a nascent competitor, the government, to
build a prima facie case, will be required to make some demonstration that the
acquisition is anticompetitive. In that undertaking, several forms of evidence
may be relevant, including the beginnings of direct competition, or the
existence of competition in markets adjacent to the incumbent’s primary
market, which would be lost if the deal is permitted.
Also relevant will be any evidence that suggests the motive for the acquisition
or the intent behind it.105 In other words, as we discuss in greater detail in Section
III.A, intent evidence may clarify whether the acquisition is anticompetitive, or
as the Supreme Court has put it, “whether the challenged conduct is fairly
characterized as ‘exclusionary’ [or] ‘anticompetitive . . . .’”106 Other forms of
evidence typically used to build a prima facie case, such as evidence of higher
prices, will not typically be available, given that a nascent competitor, by its
nature, has not begun to fully compete at the time of acquisition.
If the plaintiff presents evidence sufficient to build a prima facie case that
the acquisition is anticompetitive, the parties will have the opportunity to offer
a procompetitive justification for the transaction. Incumbents, of course, make
acquisitions for many reasons, many of which are procompetitive or otherwise
benign. For example, an incumbent might buy a small, unproven firm to
acquire complementary technology or expertise or simply to make a bet on a
moon shot.107 Careful consideration of the asserted justification helps to limit
enforcement to those acquisitions which are truly anticompetitive. In some
cases, though not all, the available evidence will make clear that the claimed
justification is merely pretextual.
One particularly important justification is “incubation”: that the acquirer
improves the targeted business in a fashion that would otherwise never occur.
However, credit for incubating a startup is subject to the caveat, common to all
merger analysis, that the benefit must be a merger specific efficiency.108
Consider, for example, Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram. Facebook has
argued that the purpose of this acquisition was to incubate a promising company,

105 See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[K]nowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and predict consequences.”).
106 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985).
107 Anticompetitive acquisitions may result in adding talent, so the fact that talent was acquired
does not, by itself, suggest that the deal was harmless.
108 2010 HMG, supra note 29, § 10 (“The Agencies credit only those eﬃciencies likely to be
accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either
the proposed merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive eﬀects.”).
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not to cabin a future threat,109 and that Instagram only proved a success because
of the care, attention, and engineering talent that it supplied.110
Incubation claims merit careful consideration. To make the case that its
acquisition was a merger-speciﬁc eﬃciency, an acquirer would need to present
evidence that similar beneﬁts could not have been achieved if the target had
been allowed to grow on a standalone basis or in the hands of an alternative
acquirer.111 Such a case would need to contend with contrary evidence, where
present, of the funding and support oﬀered (or available) from alternative
acquirers or independent investors.112 When one or more alternatives are
similarly well positioned to fuel the ﬁrm’s growth, a claim of merger-speciﬁc
eﬃciencies is likely to fail.
A. Evidence of an Anticompetitive Plan
As this suggests, in the evaluation of the competitive eﬀects, the diﬃcult
challenge is to distinguish an anticompetitive acquisition from a harmless or
procompetitive deal. Given the uncertainties and faced with a lack of clear
economic evidence of eﬀects, we suggest that strong evidence of
anticompetitive intent is a fruitful way to draw the line.
The relevant intent that we have in mind is that the incumbent sought to
eliminate a competitive threat, and that the acquisition was designed to
accomplish that goal. Intent evidence of this kind is useful as a way to shed
light on the acquisition’s eﬀects. It “help[s] the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences.”113 An enforcer should look for, and the court should
weigh, such evidence in its various forms.

For an argument along these lines, see Jacobson & Mufarrige, supra note 47, at 14-15.
See The Aspen Inst., A Conversation with Mark Zuckerberg, YOUTUBE (June 26, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHk2WfL5Gs4 [https://perma.cc/P8SH-437G].
111 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines state:
109
110

[I]t is incumbent upon the merging ﬁrms to substantiate eﬃciency claims so that the
Agencies can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each
asserted eﬃciency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so),
how each would enhance the merged ﬁrm’s ability and incentive to compete, and why
each would be merger-speciﬁc.
2010 HMG, supra note 29, § 10.
112 See, e.g., Kara Swisher, The Money Shot, VANITY FAIR (May 6, 2013),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2013/06/kara-swisher-instagram [https://perma.cc/2GDV26UQ] (describing, in the particular context of Instagram, a competing acquisition offer and funding
from venture capital investors).
113 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (considering intent
evidence “relevant only to the extent it helps us understand the likely eﬀect”).
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Intent evidence in antitrust cases is frequently criticized,114 and we agree
with some of the criticism. To be clear, we do not favor liability simply
because an investigation uncovers a sales manager’s expressed wish “to
destroy the competition.” Such evidence lacks probative value. What agencies
and courts should care about, as always, is evidence of an anticompetitive
plan, design, or program. We do not attempt to enumerate all the types of
evidence that might be relevant to an evaluation of intent, but focus on
several that are particularly important in practice.
The simplest form of intent evidence is documents showing a speciﬁc
concern with future threats, coupled with conduct that eliminates the threat.
When the parties say something speciﬁc and detailed about their
anticompetitive plan, we should believe them. Leading examples include
Microsoft’s Tidal Wave memo and Facebook’s detailed internal assessments
of particular threats and what to do about them.115
Beyond documentary evidence, an anticompetitive design might also be
shown by conduct. For example, a firm’s broader pattern of acquiring nascent
competitors sheds light on its intent in making each acquisition. Such evidence
might be reinforced by proof of an internal program to identify rising
competitors that matches the firm’s completed and attempted acquisitions.116
Economic evidence of sacriﬁce, though not an essential identifying
feature, would buttress the proof of intent. For example, an overpayment to
acquire the ﬁrm, compared to the benchmark oﬀers of other would-be
acquirers, may suggest an anticompetitive purpose,117 though consideration
must be given to benign explanations for the premium, including an
incumbent’s superior information about the standalone value of the ﬁrm.
Moreover, a ﬁrm pursuing a defensive acquisition strategy may be willing to
repeatedly overpay to acquire relative longshots in order to preserve its
position, as opposed to developing the business. A track record of multiple
acquisitions of nascent competitors that turned out in retrospect to be duds
is a further indication of such sacriﬁce.
114 See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 69, at ¶ 1506 (“Emphasizing purpose
frequently masks a failure to analyze the conduct. The judge or jury seems more comfortable
examining the defendant’s soul than analyzing his conduct and why antitrust policy calls for its
prohibition or toleration.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopolization: Past, Present and Future, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 99, 102 (1992) (broadly criticizing the use of intent evidence while acknowledging
its utility, in principle, to “distinguish acts and plans that will reduce rivals’ elasticity of supply from
those . . . that increase market share by oﬀering more goods at lower prices”).
115 See supra Section I.A.
116 See, e.g., Schechner & Olson, supra note 18 (describing such a program at Facebook).
117 See Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of
Creative Destruction, 9 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 485, 505 (2000) (discussing an incumbent’s
higher willingness to pay for an innovation in order to maintain monopoly market structure). For
an example of overpayment as a form of sacriﬁce that provides evidence of anticompetitive eﬀect,
see generally FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
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B. Later-Acquired Evidence
Some enforcement actions to protect nascent competitors may take the
form of challenges to consummated mergers. Enforcers have legal latitude to
bring such a case.118 Antitrust law has a statute of limitations, but it does not
apply to injunctive relief.119 Moreover, laches—an unreasonable delay in
bringing the suit—does not apply to the government.120
Most legal adjudication is backward looking. In contrast, since the passage
of the Hart–Scott–Rodino Act in 1976, most merger adjudication has been
forward looking: decisions under the Clayton Act have been based on
projections as to what the eﬀects of a merger might be, not what they were.121
Due to this forward-looking posture, the enforcement agency and the court,
considering an acquisition of a nascent competitor before the fact, are in the
unusual position where delay may be expected, in some respects, to increase
the accuracy of decision. Facts that the enforcer has trouble seeing today often
become clearer later. There may be costs to waiting—notably, the difficulty and
disruptiveness of after-the-fact divestiture, if that is the chosen remedy122—but
accuracy considerations tend to favor delay.123
The beneﬁts of waiting are more pronounced when there is an initial
asymmetry of information between the parties and the enforcer.124 If an
incumbent acts expeditiously to dispatch a nascent threat, that will occur at a
point in time at which it is diﬃcult to tell what is really going on. This
problem is particularly evident in industries marked by rapid technological
See Hemphill, supra note 73, at 1986-87.
15 U.S.C. § 15b (2018) (establishing a four-year statute of limitations for suits seeking
monetary damages); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 69, at ¶ 1205b (“[T]he four-year
limitation applies only to damage suits, not to actions in equity.”).
120 See Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 928 (9th Cir. 1975)
(“Laches cannot ordinarily be asserted against the sovereign.”), overruled on other grounds by California
v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990); United States v. Pennsalt Chems. Corp., 262 F. Supp. 101, 101
(E.D. Pa. 1967) (“Laches is no defense in a suit by the government to vindicate a public right.”); see also
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 69, at ¶ 320g (describing this as the “usual proposition”).
121 Hosp. Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (“A predictive
judgment, necessarily probabilistic and judgmental rather than demonstrable . . . is called for.”).
122 See, e.g., Sher, supra note 104, at 81-82 (discussing practical diﬃculties of divestiture).
123 The usual expectation is that, all else being equal, the passage of time will lead to reduced
accuracy. Witnesses disappear or forget things, documents are lost, and physical evidence decays.
These are typical justifications for a statute of limitations. Of course, delays that are justified for
factfinding, such as delays to allow discovery and trial, may increase accuracy, and there may be ways,
specific to certain laws, that delay leads to greater accuracy. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Patient Patents:
Can Certain Types of Patent Litigation Be Beneficially Delayed?, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 429 (2017)
(emphasizing the benefits of delay for accurate patent adjudication).
124 Cf. Marco Ottaviani & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Policy Timing Under Uncertainty: Ex
Ante Versus Ex Post Merger Control (Aug. 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c28a/3c4483077369fda4db01adc7cad556f4ce53.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JJC-HLG9] (noting the importance of private information held by parties).
118
119
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change. The incumbent, centered in its industry, and highly sophisticated, is
likely to see any threat more clearly, and uniquely so. This asymmetry is
exacerbated when the incumbent sits at the center of a larger platform
ecosystem, and (relatedly) when it acts as a middleman, giving it a privileged
view into developments on the edges.125
The incumbent has an incentive to exploit its information advantage and
acquire a nascent rival during a period when the enforcer has low confidence about
the benefits of enforcement. However, this period of asymmetry is not necessarily
permanent. Several types of evidence may emerge with the passage of time.
Testimony and documentary evidence. New witnesses and documents may
surface as employees exit the merged ﬁrm or leaks occur. This evidence might
shed light on the acquirer’s true intent or its understanding of competitive
eﬀects, namely fears that the acquired ﬁrm posed a serious competitive threat.
Such documentary and testimonial evidence might have been discoverable,
in principle, during a pre-acquisition investigation. However, in practice this
evidence might be suppressed at ﬁrst, given the parties’ strong incentive to
leave enforcers in the dark. Also probative is an after-the-fact assessment by
the parties evaluating the competitive eﬀects of the deal.126
Pattern of acquisitions. Other evidence is available only after the fact. For
example, a ﬁrm’s broader pattern of acquiring many nascent competitors
sheds light on its intent, relative to what is apparent from a single transaction.
An ongoing program of buying up any and all serious nascent threats to
maintain dominance might not be clear to the world until much later.
Actual eﬀects of the acquisition. Waiting until after the deal has been
completed also produces new objective evidence about its competitive eﬀects.
Most obviously, the post-transaction world produces data about what actually
happened—for example, that prices increased or quality worsened. This is an
obvious point as applied to a horizontal merger that actually raises prices; the
price rise is no longer a prediction but an observed fact.127 The same idea
applies to anticompetitive harms arising from the acquisition of a nascent

125 See, e.g., Lina Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 97778 (2019) (emphasizing this issue in the context of online platforms).
126 See, e.g., Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007) (slip op. at 73)
(“[O]ur analysis is a retrospective inquiry based on empirical evidence and documents reﬂecting the
parties’ post-merger assessments of the deal.”).
127 Orley Ashenfelter et al., Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers?
Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 57 J.L. & ECON. S67 passim (2014); Nathan H. Miller &
Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the Price Eﬀects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture, 85
ECONOMETRICA 1763, 1763 (2017) (concluding that the MillerCoors joint venture increased prices);
see also JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 154 (2014) (collecting and assessing a large set of merger retrospectives).
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competitor. This point extends to eﬃciencies, whose likelihood and
magnitude are diﬃcult to assess ex ante.128
To make use of post-transaction data in this way is not necessarily
straightforward, because it entails a prediction about an unobserved state of the
world—namely, what would have happened in the but-for world where the deal
was blocked. Moreover, in nascent competition cases, there is relatively little or
no direct competition at the time of the transaction; thus, the effect may be
difficult to detect using price or quality data. Indeed, even though the transaction
is anticompetitive as compared to the proper but-for world, one might well see
no change in the observed world before versus after the transaction.
Market conditions. It is sometimes hard to assess, at the time of acquisition,
whether the incumbent’s market power will last. The importance of a particular
barrier to entry may become clearer over time. For example, in the early 2000s,
not everyone understood the longer-term significance of data, and that control
of data might have significant competitive implications. Another way to say this
is that in setting enforcement priorities, the expected cost of inaction changes.
Ex ante, it may seem low. But enforcers may recognize later that failing to act is
unexpectedly costly, given the seriousness of preexisting barriers.
For example, when Facebook acquired WhatsApp in 2014, the durability
of its dominance in social network services was not entirely clear. Many
industry observers believed Facebook’s dominance was under threat as new
ﬁrms ate away at its user base.129 Only some of those ﬁrms survived, and they
collectively failed to supplant Facebook. This suggests that the barriers to
successful entry were higher than they might have appeared.
Conversely, the passage of time may also demonstrate the lack of durable
market power. For example, when AOL merged with Time Warner in 2000,
enforcers crafted a remedy premised on concerns about AOL’s power over the
market for instant messaging.130 However, AOL’s position was ephemeral. Its hold
over instant messaging was a function of its relative share of Internet users, which
declined due to increased competition from other Internet service providers.131
Furthermore, the general-purpose nature and disruptive importance of a
particular technology may become clearer to everyone over time. For example,
Microsoft predicted early on the long-term importance of the Internet and the
128 Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Eﬃciency, Consumer Welfare, and
Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1048-49 (1987); Brian A. Facey, The Future of Looking
Back: The Eﬃcient Modeling of Subsequent Review, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 519, 524-25 (1999); Menesh
S. Patel, Merger Breakups, WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020-21) (manuscript at 30),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469984.
129 See Madrigal, supra note 17.
130 Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc, Transferors, to AOL Time Warner
Inc., Transferee, 16 FCC Rcd. 6547, 6627 (2001).
131 See WU, supra note 31, at 264-68 (describing the rise of competing Internet service providers).
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browser;132 the correctness of that prediction gradually became clear.
Instagram was onto something by being “mobile first.” We know today that
mobile was the future; at the time, this was suspected but not established.
To be clear, we are not arguing that liability exists if technological change,
subsequent to the transaction, results in a convergence of markets that no one
anticipated at the time. Such a development cuts oﬀ the causal link between
the acquisition and subsequent poor market performance. But it might be, for
example, that the incumbent, with a keen understanding of its own industry,
understood well that a ﬁrm was highly likely to be a future competitor, in a
manner not yet recognized by the enforcer.
New economic learning. Finally, the passage of time may also furnish new
economic evidence and new tools that are useful for evaluating the eﬀects of
a particular transaction. One source of insight about competitive eﬀects is the
outcome of other closely related market contexts. For example, by looking at
the average eﬀects of other (permitted) transactions, we can form a prediction
about the eﬀects of this deal.133 New economic tools, much like improved
DNA analysis of a crime scene, might improve the accuracy of adjudication
as well. These are beneﬁts of waiting to bring a suit, as opposed to beneﬁts
of ex post review as such.
* * *
These are just examples of existing facts that might become clearer over
time. It is true that some of these matters might be estimated or guessed at the
time of acquisition or other forms of alleged exclusion. And, of course, waiting
is sometimes the wrong call. By the time the enforcer acts, it may be too late.
That said, waiting can have an important beneﬁt in reducing agency
uncertainty about key facts. Over time, the fog may clear. Key facts known
only to the incumbent may become common knowledge. And relying on the
facts that emerge may, moreover, be helpful to a generalist judge, whose daily
diet is backward-looking cases, and for whom the complex economic
projections relied on for merger cases may be mystifying.
Ex post enforcement nevertheless troubles some observers, particularly
when it takes the form of a challenge to a consummated transaction.134 This
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
A leading example is the FTC’s retrospective analyses of hospital mergers. See Edith Ramirez,
Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at ABA Retrospective Analysis of Agency Determinations
in Merger Transactions Symposium: Retrospectives at the FTC: Promoting an Antitrust Agenda 3-5
(June 28, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/retrospectives-ftcpromoting-antitrust-agenda/130628aba-antitrust.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F9P-G7VA)] (discussing this
work, begun in 2002, and its results).
134 See, e.g., Muris & Nuechterlein, supra note 47 (proposing a high bar for challenges to
consummated transactions).
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position is in tension with the view that a high degree of certainty is required
in any merger challenge. If (contrary to our view) a high degree of certainty
is required to challenge the acquisition of a nascent competitor, we should be
more willing to wait, if necessary, for the level of conﬁdence to increase. It
might sometimes appear that a cautious approach is desirable; but if so, a
corollary is that once the requisite facts are available to enforcers, it is
appropriate to act. Indeed, the virtues of a cautious approach ex ante are
increased by retaining the option to act ex post; otherwise enforcers are
precipitated into acting even when doing so might be premature.135
CONCLUSION
The acquisition or exclusion of unproven innovators is properly regarded
as a core concern of antitrust law. Evidence of anticompetitive intent—
particularly evidence of a larger anticompetitive design that spans multiple
acts—can help to resolve the diﬃcult question of distinguishing salutary from
anticompetitive acquisitions.
Enforcement agencies must be ready to intervene ex post when a pattern of
anticompetitive conduct becomes clearer. As we have explained, ex post
enforcement is sometimes inevitable and has some desirable features. The
distinctive setting of nascent competition tends to lend support to later evaluation
and to longstanding remedial proposals that incorporate ex post scrutiny, such as
conditional clearance that effectively places a merger on parole.136
Our analysis highlights a gap in the enforcement agencies’ guidance
directed toward horizontal and nonhorizontal mergers. Neither set of
135 A subtle issue arises with ex post enforcement against certain exceptional deals that are
beneficial overall in ex ante expected value terms but anticompetitive ex post. See Marco Ottaviani &
Abraham L. Wickelgren, Ex Ante or Ex Post Competition Policy? A Progress Report, 29 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.
356, 357-58 (2011) (identifying this issue). For example, suppose that the deal confers upon consumers a
merger-specific benefit of fifty together with a harm of twenty, and that the harmful effect is also the
source of profits motivating the deal. Such a deal might be permitted given the net benefit of thirty. If
the harm is probabilistic—a 20% chance of a harm of 100, let’s say—the deal is still beneficial in expected
value terms. Evaluated on a purely ex post basis, however, it might be found unlawful in those instances
where the anticompetitive effect is realized. The result is a false positive, judged from the standpoint of
encouraging ex ante beneficial deals. We expect such outcomes to be rare, but if they arise, merging
parties should be free to defend their deal on the ground that they are the exceptional case.
136 For advocates of ex post review, see Brodley, supra note 128, at 1049 (“The conclusion seems
inescapable that if an eﬃciencies defense is to be recognized in antitrust law, the eﬃciency claim
must be subject to ex post review.”); Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address to
the ABA Antitrust Section: Subsequent Review: A Slightly Diﬀerent Approach to Antitrust
Enforcement (Aug. 7, 1995) (“The advantages of this approach are obvious. The parties are allowed
to complete the transaction, and achieve claimed eﬃciencies, and the Commission has an
opportunity to observe whether anticompetitive eﬀects actually emerge.”); see also Steven C. Salop,
Modifying Merger Consent Decrees to Improve Merger Enforcement Policy, ANTITRUST, Fall 2016, at 15,
15 (advocating “more frequent reviews of consummated mergers that have been cleared without
challenge, particularly those that were close calls”).

1910

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1879

guidelines distinctively addresses nascent competitors in the sense described
in this Article.137 The absence of separate attention to nascent competition
steers enforcers too strongly toward an assessment of standard horizontal
issues, including limited accommodation of future competition under the
banner of potential competition, when nascent competition requires a distinct
analysis. An expansion of the guidelines may therefore be warranted to
account for acquisitions that eliminate a nascent, innovative threat.

137

Cf. note 62 and accompanying text (discussing potential competition).

